Essay Contribution by Edin Beslagic
May 4, 2007

19th Century Bosnian Autonomy Efforts : Original Research

In 1463, the medieval kingdom of Bosnia came under control of the Ottoman Empire. From that time and until the end of the 19th century (and even much further past that point) many neighboring and distant countries and kings expressed varying degrees of interest in either destabilizing or stabilizing Bosnia. In 1878, the “country” changed hands – from control of the Ottoman Empire to the Austro-Hungarian rule. For the duration of almost that entire preceding century, various external forces were interested in this blighted land and exerted their influence and military muscle in order to change its geopolitical borders from 1815-1878. Furthermore, Bosnia experienced various uprisings and civil unrest. Populated by a mosaic of various groups of people, the question of Bosnian identity remains practically unanswered to this day. Just who were these uprising people of Bosnia and for what cause or causes were they willing to stake their lives? An important question must therefore also be raised – were the people of Bosnia attempting to gain autonomy during this time period and what was the driving force behind it?

Before these questions can be satisfactorily answered, the definition of Bosnia and Bosnians must be presented. Its very own name is derived from a toponym based on a River – “Bosna.” Geographically, and historically speaking, the borders of Bosnia have not been changed much in, or near, the 19th century. Its northern and eastern borders are well-defined by rivers Una, Sava and Drina while its southern and western borders are essentially carved up by a steep range of mountains. The southern side of what is presently, and during the 19th century, called Bosnia is also defined by an agrarian border; the green fertile lands of Bosnia are kept in by the mountains while just across the border a barren sun-scorched landscape shapes its neighboring countries.

Secondly, the identity of people of Bosnia must be examined in greater depth in order to properly understand issues surrounding it and its people. Now that the territorial definition of Bosnia has been established, a simple answer to who Bosnians are is the people who live within the border of Bosnia. This is, however, a gross oversimplification of a very complex make-up of society. This question of the Bosnian identity is best described in words of one author as he states that “Racial history is the bane of the Balkans.” There is no consistent racial or ethnic composition of the entire region, including Bosnia. Therefore, in order to properly explain Bosnians a third, temporal, dimension must be added to the definition. Who were Bosnians over the last two millennia?

An incorrect, yet, simple answer would be to characterize early Bosnians as descendants of Illyrian provinces, as some eclectic societies with unifying agendas would believe; then again, history tells patient historians a different story. Bosnians cannot be defined under a single label. The true narrative of Bosnian ethnographic history consists of a very turbulent and uncertain origin of all sets of people who have ever lived in or occupied the territory of Bosnia and its neighboring states. In order to solve this riddle, a startling fact provides a glimpse into the past – by 1531, nearly all of Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire spoke some form of a Slavic language. This ethnological fact is the Rosetta stone to understanding Bosnian people and their relationship to the Ottoman Empire.

Many academics have tried to explain Bosnians as either aspects of Croats or Serbs. The logic behind this classification lies in the fact that the people of that land speak “Serbo-Croatian” and that Bosnia is sandwiched by the two countries. As presentable as that seems, this notion is unfortunately anachronistic. First of all, Serb and Croat languages are actually just two of many similar dialects of the Slavic language. Secondly, their only significant difference lies in differing alphabets – Croats use the Latin alphabet while Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet. Thirdly, the Roman province of Ragusa (Presently called Dubrovnik) has historically acted as a cultural center of Croatia. In this province, the Croat literature was coined and solidified from roughly 1835 to 1843 and soon countered by the Serb intellectuals. The foremost authority in Serbian literature, Vuk Karadžić, conversely believed that a Serb was anyone who spoke the Štokavian dialect.

In this period of development, the Croat literature movement had to pick a consistent dialect to be used for writing. The preferred dialect, which they picked, was “Štokavian” and not “Kajkavian.” Strangely enough, this dialect originated in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, but not what is presently known as Croatia. This fact invalidates defining Bosnians as Croats – because Croats could just as easily be defined as Bosnians – and conversely Serbs could easily be defined as Bosnians.

Specifically, the factor that distinctively set Bosnians apart from other people was the willingness of the inhabitants to convert to Islam during the Reign of the Ottoman Empire. Not all people of Bosnia converted, and there is no one specific reason as to why religious conversions were more frequent there, but suffice it to say that the motivating force behind the conversion was preferential treatment by the social order of the Ottoman Empire. Similar conversion rates took place in neighboring Albania; but, unlike there, in Bosnia the peasantry remained largely Christian. Muslims suffered commensurately with their Christian counterparts under the late period of Ottoman rule but their life was just slightly easier: they would pay fewer taxes, do better in legal proceedings, had a better social status and were not expected to observe prohibitions which were applied to Christians. Some of these prohibitions included not being able to bear firearms or wear rich clothes. Christian houses could not be built taller than nearing Muslim houses, their Churches could not have bells and there were a limited number of Churches that were allowed to be repaired but no new Churches were allowed to be constructed. Even furthermore, Christians were expected to dismount from their horse respectfully when passing a Muslim on horseback, as an act of subjugation.

These differences in lifestyles would ultimately lead toward hostile economic, religious and cultural polarization between Bosnian land owners and the working peasants. It is a major cause of tension even to the present day because normal economic divisions got a second layer of religious overtones. It must be understood that Bosnia has a fairly concise geographical definition while it has a vague ethnic, cultural or religious definition. A “Bosnian” is a person who lives within the borders of Bosnia – regardless of religion.

It is therefore very confusing to understand history of Bosnia in the context of 19th century autonomy attempts. If Bosnians were trying to gain autonomy from the Ottoman Empire at this time, what did that really mean? For the purpose of this thesis, Bosnians will be considered as anyone living in the territory of Bosnia who did not have separatist tendencies to join other countries (such as Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia).

This Islamic landowner class of Bosnia did not rise out of thin air. This group of people was merely a continuation of the economic “haves” who conformed in order to preserve their financial and ownership status. While their conversion to Islam may not have increased their capabilities in the society, the failure to convert to Islam certainly lowered the rights and prestige of their tenants. On top of the preexisting economic division, a new factor would come to add to the polarization of Bosnia – lex talionis. The Ottoman Empire treated nearly all Muslims under same laws and extended privileges to them; as a consequence of this, non-Muslim resentment of this preferential treatment took root.

The officials of the Ottoman Empire were fully aware of ethnic group incongruities in Bosnia; however, their primary goal for the land was very pragmatic. Throughout its reign, the Ottoman Empire was very effective at warfare but not so much in politics or diplomacy. Bosnia, as geographically defined, functioned as a buffer state against the Habsburg Empire. This relationship is really the first example of an external force using Bosnia as a pawn.

Turkish strength prior to at least 1826 was drawn from Janissary corps, an elite class of professional soldiers and their nature is best described in words of R. W. Seton-Watson:

“The child tribute, by which the famous corps of Janissaries was recruited, was a double source of strength, for on the one hand it made good the comparative sterility of the Turks, and on the other drained the best forces of the subject population. Thus by a refinement of cruelty, the unhappy Christians saw the flower of their youth converted into the deadliest instrument for prolonging their subjection.”

The Janissaries had gradually gained power over the Sultan and this was reflected by their behavior in Serbia. In 1804 a number of important Serbian figures were massacred by Janissaries acting on their own directive in Belgrade. As a result, a revolt led by George Petrović (also known as Kara George) was sparked. The intent of the revolt was to secure rights of Serbs under the Sultanate but a number of factors led to some nationalization backed by Orthodox-Christian clergy. The Serbs organized a semblance of a government but were put down nine years later and returned to Turkish Rule.

This Serbian drive toward independence surely influenced some people in Bosnia who considered themselves related to Serbs; however, in Bosnia an incident of a different nature took place in 1813. Bosnians at this time enjoyed great autonomy; however, the newly appointed local governor of Bosnia, Siliktar Ali-Paša, apparently decided to assert his dominance over traditional hierarchy of power. Traditionally he was allowed to only spend three days in Sarajevo (capital of Bosnia); however, he announced that he would spend six months there and an alternate site. This action enraged the local lords and the middle class populace. As a consequence, the governor used military force to crush dissenters. Similar actions were taken in 1814, and again in 1820 as a deterrent against rebellion during the warfare in Greece conducted by Mohammed Ali-Pasha of Egypt.

In 1826, the infamous Auspicious Incident took place. The Sultan thwarted a coup d’État by having his newly regimented army exterminate Janissaries in Istanbul. Bosnian Janissaries, who had gained great power in the country, were simply shocked. Having been physically isolated from the Sultan himself and his new army, they resisted change and were very unwilling to comply with military and governmental reforms imposed by the Sultan. As a consequence, in 1827 the Sultan ordered an expeditionary force to be sent from Belgrade to Sarajevo; resistance was crushed but sprung up shortly thereafter. Indeed, the very next year the leader of Ottoman forces, Abdurahman-paša, was forced to make a strategic retreat out of Sarajevo. What had once been a cause for Christian resentment toward Muslim landowners had now become an element of resistance to change; the Bosnian elite resented the westernization of the Turkish military.

Remote distance, geographical inaccessibility, and events abroad deterred any immediate action by the Sultanate. In 1831 another rebellion took place in Bosnia, led by a Bosnian Muslim named Husejn. Before the rebellion could be dealt with, an uprising in nearby Kosovo took place; Husejn led his forces of 25,000 soldiers to put it down in hopes of gaining favor from the Ottoman Empire. His grand strategy included himself as a bargaining chip on the Ottoman tables and his terms were simple. He and his forces managed to put down the uprising but no prior promises were kept by the Turkish government.

Instead, this Bosnian rebellion of Husejn was put down by military action. For the next twenty years a number of small political brush fires would be efficiently put down by forces of the Ottoman Empire. These rebellions could be classified as an effort at autonomy – but autonomy for the wealthy, by the wealthy. Masses of the poor peasants have in these instances been apathetic to the power struggle of the ruling class. These elite uprisings were instigated by limitation in power and change of status quo in the power structure of the land. They could be considered reverberations of previous Ottoman resistance to reforms by the Sultanate.

The poor peasants, on the other hand, did commit insurrections of their own as early as 1834 and 1842 as a response to harsh demands by their Muslim landowners. In 1848 a higher rate of pay was required from farmers and this caused several more rural uprisings by 1862. Of much importance is the condition in which these people lived. First of all, cultivation methods were rudimentary and back-breaking and as such did not yield efficient crops. Plowing was done by wooden implements, hand and drawn by oxen on largely uneven ground. The level of production was left at bare minimum – enough to survive and pay taxes with. Since the peasants were taxed largely in form of grain, this would take a major economic toll on farming peasants, especially during times of drought. At times, these conditions led peasants to civil unrest and uprising.

The poor rural peasants did rebel – but not for purposes of obtaining a state of autonomy. Instead, they rose up, largely without decisive organizational structure, against economic oppression by their landlords. Many of these peasants were Christians organized in villages while Muslims largely concentrated in cities due to their function as administrative centers of the Ottoman Empire. These Christians would still be classified as Bosnians as they had no separatist drive – they were technically separated as it were.

Contemporary scholars of this time considered these uprisings as a result in rise of nationalism and specifically as a result of three factors: first one was oppression of Christians by Muslims; second a result of interference of Great Powers and third a rise in national feeling which ultimately led to war in the twentieth century. Russia was probably the strongest European power at the beginning of the 19th century but sheer power was not the decisive factor in European politics. Power was shared and contended with by Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia under Tsar Alexander I. Nevertheless, Russian interests lay with the Black Sea, Caspian Sea access, and essentially pushing back the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Its particular portal into the area of discussion was Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Its involvement consisted of playing chess with pawns made from buffer states.

For instance, as early as 1820 Russia placed its military and political weight behind Serbia in a symbolic gesture supporting their independence from the Ottoman Empire. As an indirect result of this action, Austria-Hungary strengthened its presence in Croatia along the Bosnian border and seriously considered an all-out invasion of the territory. During this time, Serbia made a heavy push toward independence from the Ottoman Empire. In 1829, under the Treaty of Adrianople, Serbia was promised autonomy under a Russian protectorate. In the years that followed, until around 1869, a multilateral power struggle took place in Serbian government between Milosh Obrenovich, Kara George, Alexander Karageorgevich, Michael Obrenovich III and Milan Obrenovich.

Due to the Russian involvement, Serbia was allowed growth at this time. In 1826 its influence allowed for partial Serbian autonomy to be recognized by the Ottoman Empire at the Convention of Akkerman; the state was then viewed as a Russian protectorate. Its official autonomy was granted in 1829 under the Treaty of Adrianople and in 1856 its status of a Russian protectorate was revoked. While the entire Ottoman Empire fleet was destroyed by Rusisa, It would take another twenty years before Turkish garrisons withdrew from Serbia, in 1867, and its Independence was officially granted in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin.

By 1870s the situation in Bosnia has worsened for the Christian peasants. The Ottoman Empire, under pressure from multiple sides has relaxed its hold on that buffer state. Various reasons, including bad crop yield in 1874 and a contagion of rebellions, caused a major insurrection in 1875. The forces of the Ottoman Empire were not able to put down this uprising because the peasants employed guerilla warfare tactics against them. The conflict escalated further and major players and the Great Powers became intricately involved in its outcome.

More than one third of the population involved in the uprising was Muslim and the other two thirds consisted of mostly what could be considered as Serbs and Croats. The Serb insurgents inside Bosnia looked toward Serbia for protection and hoped to be annexed; conversely, Croat separatist insurgents looked toward their national homeland and Dalmatia. Austro-Hungary backed the idea of Croat expansion into Bosnia and considered invading it in order to protect their Dalmatian border.

While Serbia was sympathetic toward the Christian peasants in Bosnia, it was under direct Russian pressure to abstain from involvement; Serbia, however, had its eyes on Bosnia since at least 1804, at which time the country had hoped to expand their territory westward. Not even a year after the insurrection in Bosnia started, the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) was deposed and multiple concurrent revolts which took place in Bulgaria turned international eyes away from this area, allowing for Serbia to try their expansionary luck.

As early as 1867, Serbia had formed serious plans to “liberate Bosnia” from the Ottoman rule. What this meant, specifically, was that Bosnia would be territorially annexed by Serbia. Serbia, under some Russian guidance and with some Russian military advisors, such as General Cherniaev, invaded Bosnia in hopes of annexing the territory for a Greater Serbia. The military action proved to be a complete and utter disaster due to a multitude of factors; the Serb soldiers were ill-equipped and untrained, General Cherniaev proved to be inept and Russian government failed to provide direct assistance to the effort. The invading forces were no match for superior fighting experience of the forces of the Ottoman Empire. Serbs lost fifteen thousand men in the conflict and problem of the Bosnian revolt was for them never resolved.

In 1876, under the cover of Serbia declaring war on the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers (Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany) had decidedly carved up the Balkans; under their agreement, territory of Bosnia fell under Austria-Hungarian control. In August of 1878, the Austrian forces entered Bosnia with some 82,000 soldiers. They bombarded Sarajevo on August 18th, and by late October the entire country was considered under strict occupation; the Austrians suffered minor casualties and in words of Noel Malcolm, “given the appalling state of most of the roads, it is barely an exaggeration to say that the Austrian army conquered Bosnia in the time it took to walk through the country.”

As the power of the Ottoman Empire was slowly fading away in the region, the Great Powers of Britain, Russia, Austro-Hungary and Prussia exerted influence over territories. After all arrangements had been put in place, by 1870 no country in the Balkans could make any significant decision without the direct consent of the Great Powers. The Balkan states had become puppets for the largest and most powerful countries.

After Austro-Hungary marched through Bosnia, Russia became increasingly worried about the German unification and expansion in Europe. Russian tolerance of the invasion had thus far been an act of balancing of power and its consequent tolerance. Germany was becoming an industrial giant while Russian military was changing forms from a strong land military power to a strong naval military power. Therefore Russian concerns lay with the access to the Caspian Sea for the purposes of fault redundancy in an event of war, and for the obvious quick access routes to Europe and the Mediterranean.

Due to the 1876 defeat of Serbian forces, Russia severed close relations with Serbia; however, in an act of what can be described as a protective act toward Serbia, the Russian government forced the Ottoman Empire to sign an armistice preventing retribution. Russia was not, on the other hand, agreeable to Serbian request for aid in annexing Bosnia. Shortly after Serbia signed a peace agreement with the Ottoman Empire, it was asked for assistance in another war against Turkey – by Russia. It would appear that Russian allegiance and loyalties lay with their best interests and not with their pro-Slavic camaraderie.

For the next quarter century, Croats and Serbs would struggle over Bosnia. Interest of Croats consisted mainly of strategic defense; due to the shape of their country, their defense capability was limited. Croatia is shaped like a boomerang by the north and western Bosnian border and because of that is unable to maintain a central reserve defensive force. To make matters worse, if Serbia managed to annex Bosnia, the Croat border would escalate to at even greater potential of insecurity; in other words, a secondary objective of Croatia was to try to maintain Bosnia as a buffer state if it was unable to engulf it.

Overshadowing the interests of those two states was Austria-Hungary; the empire had invested major amount of money in infrastructure, economic, industrial and educational development of Bosnia. Since it would take a number of years to recuperate those investments, the empire was very protective of the country and repelled Croat and Serbian advances at influencing its territories. While Bosnia was at that time known to be rich in mineral and other natural resources, this was not a motivating drive behind Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia; instead, the empire wanted to prevent Serb expansion backed by Russia. If Serbia had increased in size, it would have threatened the dynamics of geopolitics in south-eastern Europe.

The Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire failed to achieve their intended goals. By 1876 the Ottoman Empire state was effectively bankrupt and had stopped making payments to creditors. As a proximal causation of the reform failures, the asymmetrical relationship between Christian peasants and Muslim landowners had never been reconciled or satisfactorily dealt with. Furthermore, in the context of Bosnia as a buffer state, the reforms failed to prevent its loss (and loss of other territories from grip of the Ottoman Empire). These reforms never specifically affected neither the landowners in Bosnia nor their Christian tenants due to the fact that their directives were never strictly enforced or guided in that region. By 1860 the reforms were criticized even by its initial backers – because they felt it violated the spirit of “Ottoman traditions.”

Where the reforms succeeded was in the areas of governing. The empire was reorganized under provinces (Vilayets) and the administrative personnel now included representatives from both Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Education was improved throughout the empire, taking the form and language of the French, as well as judicial establishments under the new Mecelle civil codes – which were based on the traditional Muslim law. The successful portions of the reforms aided toward centralizing the governmental control and standardizing various officials. These changes affected Bosnia positively but at cost of being resisted by persons in power.

Different nationalistic drives in the region were fairly uniform in their goals. These were clearly stated as “acquisition of all lands inhabited by their nationals.” For example, Greeks would attempt to expand Greece to all areas where the Greek language was predominantly spoken; Bulgarians would attempt to do the similar for their people just the same as Serbs and Croats did. A problem occurred when these nationalistic differences were too subtle or when their territorial interests were fairly mixed; therefore it can be understood why the political situation resembled scenes of chaos surrounding the withering of the Ottoman Empire.

In all, various factions of uprising in Bosnia split along the lines of economic or political interests. The wealthy elite, largely composed of Muslim landowners, wanted a political autonomy within Bosnia to propagate their standard of living. The landless poor, who were largely composed of Christian peasants, wanted reduction of economic hardship and the improving of quality of life. The tax farmers of the Ottoman Empire acted as glue between the elite and the peasants – and their goals were fairly unique: to gain as much profit as possible. Foreign countries such as Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire itself wanted to use Bosnia as a buffer state to prevent other countries from increasing its sphere of influence. It can be said that Bosnia as a country was doomed from the start by its easily defendable geographical barriers because those were largely drawn by no human being.

Bosnian nationalism did occur throughout this time period, but, it was a difficult concept to grasp considering the multiethnic and multi-religious nature of the native people. Various uprisings, revolts and insurgencies were disjointed and were considered as largely unorganized events caused by central political changes and economic conditions such as drought or a level of over-taxation of peasant farmers. If advancement of technology had surged to Bosnia during this time period it might have eased the pressure from the peasants by making their labor less intensive and therefore the annexation of Bosnia by Austro-Hungary might have been avoided.

Prosperity of Bosnia was put in the back seat until well after World War II had taken place. Bosnia was considered a backward land of Europe due to its very limited transportation infrastructure during the Austro-Hungarian occupation. In a hypothetical sense, perhaps much conflict could have been avoided if the Ottoman Empire actively pursued its various reforms during (and preceding) this time period. Furthermore, I personally wonder what might have happened if people of Bosnia had not been given the opportunity to convert to Islam and gain preferential treatment?

The polarization of ethnic groups would possibly not have occurred and the economic differences would not have followed religious lines, which would come to haunt Bosnia for many years after the 19th century. Along that same train of thought, it is possible that Pan-Slavism could have taken off as a unification factor in establishing better economic, political and cultural connections between various countries of the Balkans. On the other hand, it is likely possible that nothing would have changed except the players would have different labels – Protestants versus Catholics in a continuation of the Protestant Reformation struggle.

It is not the job of a historian to brood over what-if scenarios or predict the future, but it is important to consider these events as direct causes and direct effects in the grand scheme of the world. The next best thing a historian could do is research a similar situation with slightly different variables and then possibly examine their outcome differences.

For example, Cyprus had a diverse composition of religions but as an island it was more isolated from physical encroachment of neighboring states and politics than Bosnia was. An intense study of Cyprus during this time period would be a point of academic interest in understanding the world during the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Another country to include into this study would be Albania as a single major factor there was altered – the peasants, like the landowning elite, also converted to Islam en masse. Comparative research of these three countries certainly seems worth examining.

This Research indicated that religious factors are far and few in between that can be properly labeled as causes of either conflict or disorder in the Balkans. However, religion is often used as an aegis of zealots and political groups with hidden agendas. Most of the peasant and elite problems situated in Bosnia during the 19th century revolved around the economy and specifically money. Much like in Egypt, around this time Bosnian peasants slowly converted from their staple crops such as wheat and barley to cash crops such as cotton. This is a strong indicator of the driving forces behind the civil unrest in the Ottoman Empire.

As long as the economy is strong, the military is loyal to and serves the government, the people will conform to the standards of a state. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had lost both of those levels of control prior to the 19th century. The Janissary corps had essentially taken over power from the Sultanate and had to be dealt with in the most violent way imaginable. Part of this power shift affected Bosnia as it disrupted the natural stability of the country. Currency debasing of the Ottoman Empire and increasing public debt affected all provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Bosnia, and was a major contributing factor to public unrest of both the poor Christian peasants and the elite Muslim landowners.

This thesis paper would be improved by examining primary data from the economic records of this time period. Such records are fairly difficult to obtain and even more difficult to decipher. Furthermore they usually more accurately reflected the 20th century information as data collections often interpolated preceding decades of facts and figures. Nevertheless, I feel that an accurate snapshot of the economy would shed light on the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.

Bibliography

Gewehr, Wesley M. The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930. New York: H. Holt and Company, 1931.

Jelavich, Charles and Barbara Jelavich. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Jelavich, Barbara. Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1996.

Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A Short History. New York: New York University Press, 1994.

Seton-Watson, R. W. The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. New York: H. Fertig, 1966.